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lN THE SUPREME COURT
1

of the

STATE OF UTAH
Dl!}VERL Y HOWE,
Plaintijf-Ap pellant,

vs.

Case No.

WALTER J ACKSOX, Doing Business
as MERCY AMBULANCE,

10570

Defendant-Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries arising out
of a collision between the plaintiff driving a pick-up
truck and the defendant driving an ambulance on an
emergency run.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and
judgment for the defendant, plaintiff appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-respondent seeks an affirmace of the
judgment below.
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2
OF FACTS
Inasmuch as appellant's brief generally fails to recite the evidence supporting the verdict, we shall undertake that task.
The defendant's white ambulance (R. 12, 112 and defendant's exhibit 4) was on an emergency call from Harrisville to Ogden (R. 10). Defendant had traveled South
on a four-lane main higlnvay (R. 29) up to 60 miles per
hour (R. 7) with red light and siren operating (R. 19, 20,
21). When the defendant was about two-tenths of a mile
north of the accident intersection, the semaphore light
turm·d red for south bound traffic into the intersection
(R. S, 25). The defendant then started slowing down
(R. 8) from 50 miles per hour (R. 103) by braking (R.
15). The speed limit for south bound traffic in the
vicinity of the accident ·was 50 miles per hour (R. 24).
The plaintiff was traveling east on 12th Street approaching the intersection at 20-25 miles per hour (R. 39).
She was operating a pick-up truck with an annoying cast
on her right forearm and hand (R. 50, 52, 60). Her two
teenage daughters ·were seated in the cab of the truck
(R. 38). The plaintiff's left door window was down
(R. 53). It was a quiet Sunday morning (R. 53). Plain·
tiff had a clear view of traffic approaching from the
north (R. 32, 52, 59 and Defendant's Exhibits 1 and 2).
Plaintiff saw the defendant's ambulance approach from
the north at what appeared to plaintiff to be a fast speed
at a point three-fourths of a block north of the intersec·
tion (R. 39, 54-55). At that time and thereafter the defen·
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3
dant's red light and siren were operating and clearly
detectable (R. 53, 100, 101, 10-! and 106), although the
plaintiff claims that she never saw the red light or heard
the siren of the ambulance (R. -!1). 'l'he semaphore light
turned green in favor of the plaintiff when she was threefourths of a block west of the intersection or just as
she was entering the intersection (R. 39, 55 and 57).
The only traffic in the vicinity of the intersection
was the defendant's south bound vehicle, Martin's west
bound vehicle, and a Mr. Scivally who was stopped at
the south boundary of the intersection headed north (R.
39 and 40).
As defendant was about to enter the intersection he
observed Martin's pick-up truck start up from a stopped
position at the eastern approach to the intersection (R.
16, 26). Defendant thereupon braked further, turned
slightly to the right to avoid Martin {R. 16, 26, 118),
and entered the intersection traveling at less than 20
miles per hour (R. 11'7). Martin had no obstruction to his
view of defendant's ambulance (R. 31, Defendant's Exhibits 1 and 2) yet Martin made no attempt to avoid the
ambulance (R. 111). The front of Martin's truck struck
the left rear door and fender of the ambulance (R. 16, 33)
knocking the ambulance out of control to the west (R.
109) and into the plaintiff's pickup-truck which had entered the intersection from the west (R. 22, 23, 40, 103).
The plaintiff did not heed or otherwise observe the ambulance until after it had been struck by Martin, which
collision was not observed by the plaintiff (R. 58, 59) ·
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Plaintiffs and defondant's vd1iek•s moved but a short
distance after im1iact (R. GO, 113).
The defendant doing lnrniness as 11ercy Ambulance
Service was authorized to 01wrate ambulances by the
Township of Harrisville and the
of Roy (R. 98, 99,
138). The defendant held himself out to the public as an
ambulance servic(o (R. 11) and had subjected his ambulance service to the Public Service Commission under
the provisions of Sedion 5-±-G-1:2, U. C.A. 1953 as amended
(R. 134, 135 and Defendant's Exhibit 3).
1

ARGU:MENT
POINT 1
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN
REFUSING TO DIRECT LIABILITY AGAINST THE
DEFENDANT

Plaintiff consistently challenged the status of the
defendant as an "authorized emergency vehicle."
Throughout the trial plaintiff's JJOsition was premised
on the notion, now apparently abandoned, that defendant
could not obtain authorization as an emergency vehicle
from either Harrisville or Roy but was dependent upon
authorization from either the Public Safety Department
of Utah or Ogden City (T. 5, G, 9, 10, 35, 36, 89, 138, 139,
156). Thus evidence was introduced by defendant with
respect to authorization from Roy and Harrisville and
by plaintiff on the absence of authorization from the Department of Public Safety and Ogden. Plaintiff made no
point of the fact that defendant lacked status as a "municipal department or public service corporation." ThereSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fore no detailed evidence was introduced on such status
and qualification of the defendant other than the authorizations by the Public Service Commission, Roy and
Harrisville and that the defendant held himself out to
the public through a telephone listing. Although the
plain ti ff in her requested instruction No. 8 invited the
trial court to cite the prnvisions of Section 41-6-3, U.C.A.
1953 as amended, defining an "authorized emergency
vehicle" at no time did the plaintiff request any amplification for the jury as to what constituted municipal departments or public service corporations. Nor did the
plaintiff seek relief on this issue by motion for a new
trial. The main burden of plaintiff's present appeal that
the defendant was not a municipal department or public
service corporation is thus a novel and belated issue which
should be ignored. Chmnncy v. Stott, 14 Utah 2d 202, 381
P.2d 84.
The meaning of the terms "Public Service Corporation" ref erred to in Section 41-6-3, U.C.A. 1953 as amended may be found in the total context of Section 54-2-1,
U.C.A. 1953 as amended, the Public Utilities Act. Therein
the various public service corporations by definition
include corpo·rations and individuals.
As this court indicated in the recent case of Blomqitist & Granite Credit vs. Zion's First National Ba.nk,
______ Utah 2d ______ , ______ P.2d ------, statutes "must be looked at
carefully in cognizance of the full meaning underlying
both the terms used and the purpose sought to be accomplished." Thus comts have construed the wo·rd "corSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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poration" in statutes to indude natural persons whenever
it has aplJL'ared that the legislative intent required it. 18
Arn. Jnr. 2d, Corporations, :SL'C. 3, page 550.

In Bischcll

State, 157 P.2d -11, (Cal.), under a California statute defining an (•11wrgency vehicle as one operated by state or county "fin' 1Yarden" or "forest ranger"
a salaried employee of the Forestry Department assigned to dut.\' b.\' an authorized fire warden or forest
ranger was, in the broader sem;e of the statutory language, deemed "a fire warden."
L

There is no apparent reason to construe the term
"public service corporation" strictly and literally, as
plaintiff contPnds, so as to discriminate in favor of corporations over individuals in receiving the special status
of an authorized emergency vehicle. Such a construction
suhjects the statute to an unintended, unreasonable and
unnecessary challengL· of arbitrary discrimination which
would be constitutionall.\· objectionable. Under common
principles of construction, t->tatutes should be construed
m favor of their validity.
That the defendant conws within the ambit of public service and a public carrier is evident from the pronouncement of this court in State vs. N clson, 65 Utah
457, 238 P. 237:
"
(A) common or public carrier is one
who, by virtue of his business or calling or holding out, undertakes for eompensation to transport
perso,ns or property, or both, from one place to
anothn for all such as may ehoose to employ him.
Running through the cases is a recognition of the
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element of public service, serving and
carrymg all persons indifferently who apply for
passage or for shipment of goods or freight ...
Public service, as distinguished from mere private service, is thus necessarily a factor to constitute a common carrier. Such element, in portions of the act, is not as clearly expressed as
might be. Nevertheless, it necessarily is implied."
Such principles are embodied in SPctlon :'51-G-1. F.
C.A. 1953 as amended, which provides:
"'Common motor carrier of passengers' means
any person who holds himself out to the public
as willing to undertake for hire to transport by
motor vehicle from place to place, persons who
may choose to employ him."
Enchancing the defendant's status as a "public service corporation" and "authorized emergency vehicle"
is the defendant's authorization to operate an ambulance
as an exempt carrier under the provisions of Section
54-6-12, U.C.A. 1953 as amended, under which defendant
subjected himself to certain controls and regulations of
the Public Service Commission.
There is also authority for the proposition that even
without express statutory exemption, vehicles engaged
in emergency governmental service are exempt from the
usual traffic regulations. 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles &
Highway Traffic, Sec. 172 at page 727.

Dallas Railway and Terminal Co. vs. Walsh,
156 SW2d 320 (Tex.) is an intermediate appellate court
opinion which, in addition to the holding therein cited
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by plaintiff':-: ln·i(•f, pr<·rnised its dP(·ision upon the folJmving:
"Furtlt\•r, ev<'n if said arnlmlaiH'P was an
authorizPd
n·hielP by the single test
that it did lwlung to a pnhli(' :st>rviee corporation
tlwre \nls 11 <'V<' rtlw l<•s:s no evidence sufficif•nt to
slim\· that it had lwen 'd<·:signated' or 'authorized'
as sud1 Ji:-· tlw Chief of Poliee."
Lay us. f cllo1r Ca/1 Ta.11, 73 Atl. 2d ±21 (Del.),

cited in plaintiff's lJriL•f, is a trial eourt opinion.

1

Jn Roqers cs. City of Lus A11gelcs, ±-1 P.2d 465,
Cal. i. tli•· follo\\ ing iwrti1wnt language ::;lwuld also be

not<>d:
" ( 11l('s:-; ::;he· km•\\' or in th<' exercise of ordinslwuld have known that thP ambulance
\YaS approaching, the plaintiff driving the coupe
was under no obligation to anticipate its presence."
ary

Plaintiff's belated suggestion that the defendant does
not qualify a:::; a urnni(!ipal
er public service
l'O<l'poration should lw ignored in this appeal. In any
event tlw c·viden('e in the
court established that the
defondant was an autl10riz(•d emergency vehicle as a matter of lm\· or upon the findings implicit in the verdict.
Not only docs the evidenc\! fail to establish any negligence of the defendant as a matter of law, but it does,
\1-e submit, establish as a matter of law that the plaintiff \ms contrihntoril_\- negligent in failing to give heed
to the defendant's amlinlancp \\·hi('h she saw three-fourths
of a block mrny from the intPnwdion traveling at a fast
speed which, in tlH• Pxercise of ordinary care, she should
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have known was an emergency vehicle with red light and
siren employed. Jensen vs. Taylor 2 Utah 2d 196 271
'
'
P.2d 838; Johnson vs. Maynard, 9 Utah 2d 268, 342 P.2d
::-184; Martin vs. Ehlers, 13 Utah 2d 236, 371P.2d851.
POINT 2
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED BY PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION No. 2.

Although the lower court did express an intention of
ruling as a matter of law that the defendant was an
"authorized emergency vehicle," as heretofore indicated
in our argument under Point 1, such ruling was not
made and the court did in fact permit the parties to introduce evidence with respect to authorization and lack
of it by the Department of Public Safety and local
authorities and did submit such issue to the jury.
POINT 3
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED IN PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION No. 4.

The courts instructions No. 11 and No. 9 fairly apprised the jury that if they found that the defendant was
not an authorized emergency vehicle then he would not
be entitled to proceed past a red signal, which rule of
law is well known to all persons who can qualify as jurors.
POINT 4
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION No. 8.

Inasmuch as counsel stipulated that "local authority"
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had authorized thr> dt>fenclant as an ambulance, the alleged failure to dPsignatP the' Department of Public
Safety in the instruction could not have affected the verdict. The plaintiff's exception to the court's instruction
No. 8 was based on the premise that "the authorization
must be by the DPvartrnent of Public Safety or by local
authorities" (R. 156) without reference to defendant's
status as a municipal department or public service corporation.
POINT 5
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED IN PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION No. 8.

In view of the stipulation of plaintiff that defendant
was authorized as an ambulance by local authorities, and
the failure o.f plaintiff to make any point in the lower
court of the status of the defendant as a municipal department or public service corporation or to request
amplifying instructions thereon for the jury, we submit
that the court did not err in refusing plaintiff's instruction No. 8.
CONCLUSION
The defendant's vehicle was an "authorized emergency vehicle" as a matter of law. Plaintiff's failure to
raise any issue in the lower court on the defendant's
status as a "public service corporation" should bar plain·
tiff's present appeal thereon. As a matter of law the de·
fondant ,,-as not 1wgligcnt but the plaintiff was contrib·
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utorily negligent. The case was fairly submitted to the
jury whose verdict that the defendant was not proximately negligent and/or that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent should be affirmed.
Respectfully .rnbmitted,
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN
By JAY E. JENSEN

Attorneys for Respondents
1205 Continental Bank Bldg
Salt Lake City, Utah
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